This paper examines the relationship between ownership structure and informed trading. We attempt to reconcile some puzzling results in recent empirical literature about the impact of ownership on informed trading using a comprehensive set of proxies for informed trading and a recent sample of¯rms from three U.S equity exchanges. We¯nd strong evidence of a cross-sectional relationship between our measures of informed trading and ownership by institutions and insiders. Our results are robust to a variety of estimation techniques, control variables, and proxies for informed trading. These¯ndings are consistent with economies of scale in information acquisition and aggregation, and with recent¯ndings that market makers move prices in response to trades by institutions. Overall, our results suggest that individual investors are less informed relative to institutions and insiders.
Introduction
This paper empirically examines the relationship between ownership structure and informed trading. There is a large body of theoretical work in the spirit of Kyle (1985) that describes how markets react to the presence of informed traders. In practice, however, it is di±cult to know which market participants, if any, are informed and which are uninformed. As a reasonable proxy, many empirical studies have used ownership structure as an indication of what fraction of the equity owners are informed (see, for example, Grullon and Wang (2001) ). Speci¯cally, they assume that inside and institutional owners are informed, while individuals are uninformed. Since insiders are actively involved in managing and overseeing the¯rm, it is natural to expect that they would be privy to information that others would not have. Institutions, while not having the same access to private information that insiders have, can create an informational advantage by exploiting economies of scale in information acquisition and processing. Since their marginal costs of gathering and processing information are lower than for individuals, this may reduce the information asymmetry for rms with a large percentage of institutional ownership.
Indeed, several recent studies support the hypothesis that institutions may have better information. For example, Szewczyk, Tsetsekos and Varma (1992)¯nd that¯rms with relatively high levels of institutional ownership have a smaller price reaction to the announcement of equity o®er-ings. Alangar, Bathala and Rao (1999)¯nd an identical result for dividend change announcements.
Finally, Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky (2000) ¯nd that¯rms with high levels of institutional ownership have lower levels of post-earnings announcement drift in the stock price. While institutions may reduce information asymmetry and make markets more informationally e±cient, this does not imply that the bid-ask spread for stocks with a large institutional ownership will necessarily be lower. On the contrary, if a market maker knows he or she is trading against an informed party, the market maker will widen the spread to compensate for the cost of adverse selection.
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While these studies are consistent with the hypothesis that institutions are better informed than other owners, they o®er only indirect evidence based on reactions to corporate events. This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we o®er market microstructure evidence that links both institutional and insider ownership with four di®erent measures of informed trading. Speci¯cally, we compute the adverse selection component of the spread (Huang and Stoll (1997) , hereafter HS), the price impact of a trade (Hasbrouck (1991) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993) , hereafter HFV) and the probability of informed trading (Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara and Paperman (1996), hereafter EKOP). We then relate each of these measures to cross-sectional patterns in ownership structure. Second, we reconcile con°icting results from other studies by testing a wide variety of empirical speci¯cations. We are able to reproduce the results from other studies, and¯nd that con°icting results disappear after controlling for endogeneity. Third, our study is the¯rst to examine the interaction of ownership structure and informed trading using the price impact of a trade and the probability of informed trading. The price impact measure is important since it is based on the unexpected portion of order°ow that carries information. In other words, it is not a large trade that carries information, but rather an unexpectedly large trade that carries information. The EKOP measure is also an important instrument since it is a direct proxy for the probability that a trade is informed. Finally, we use a sample of¯rms from three U.S. exchanges and use a more recent and larger sample of data than other studies.
We have three main¯ndings. First, the magnitude of the relative spread is negatively related to the amount of institutional ownership. While at¯rst this result may seem surprising, it makes sense in the context of a model where both the spread and institutional ownership are endogenous.
While the market maker may widen the spread when trading with institutions, institutions prefer stocks with narrower spreads since they are more liquid. Second, consistent with the hypothesis that insiders are informed we¯nd that the HS measure of adverse selection, the HFV price impact of a trade, and the EKOP measure of the probability of informed trading are all positively associated 2 with the percentage of insider ownership. Third, though institutional ownership is associated with smaller relative spreads, we¯nd that it is positively associated with the HS measure of adverse selection and the HFV price impact of a trade. Furthermore, the economic magnitude of these e®ects are signi¯cant.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the results of other studies in the context of our results, Section 3 describes the construction of the measures of the informativeness of trading, Section 4 describes the data, Section 5 discusses the univariate results, Section 6 describes the multivariate results, Section 7 discusses the di®erences by exchange type, and Section 8 concludes the paper. In general, these studies have found that institutional orders move prices more than other trades.
Prior Literature
Furthermore, not only has institutional trading increased signi¯cantly over the past 20 years but institutions also trade much more than individuals (Gompers and Metrick (2001) ). One reason that institutions may trade more than individuals is that they are simply churning their clients' accounts. Since portfolio managers earn a living through active management, they may have an incentive to trade even if they have no private information (Dow and Gorton (1997) and Trueman (1988) ). On the other hand, institutions may be better informed than individuals and the more frequent trading may be based on that information.
There have been several studies that have addressed the question of whether institutions are informed. In general they have looked at the relation between ownership structure (institutional and insider), spreads, and measures of adverse selection. While ownership structure may determine the magnitude of the spread and its adverse selection component, spreads may also determine ownership structure. Falkenstein (1996) ¯nds that institutions prefer large, liquid stocks, hence the spread and institutional ownership could be simultaneously determined. Because of this, we model the determinants of both ownership structure and spreads as a system of simultaneous equations.
We¯nd that the spread is negatively related to both insider and institutional ownership.
Our results di®er somewhat from other studies. Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) ¯nd that the spread is not related to institutional ownership and positively related to insider ownership. However, this result could be driven by the fact that they did not have intraday data, leading to noisy measures of spreads. Kothare and Laux (1995) ¯nd that the spread is positively related to institutional ownership. However, they treat institutional ownership as exogenous. The relation between block ownership and spreads is examined in He°in and Shaw (2000) who¯nd that the spread is positively related to block ownership. While this seems to be at odds with our result and that of Falkenstein (1996) , He°in and Shaw examine block, not institutional ownership. Also, they¯nd that block ownership is not endogenous. In contrast, we¯nd strong evidence that institutional ownership is endogenous. Last, Sarin, Shastri and Shastri (2000) treat both ownership structure and spreads as endogenous and¯nd that the spread is positively related to institutional ownership. Again, this is at odds with our result and Falkenstien (1996) . However, when we estimate their model on our data, we continue to¯nd that spreads are negatively related to institutional ownership. Hence, their result may be driven by their particular sample of data.
To address the question of who's informed, one key relationship is the link between ownership structure and the adverse selection cost. Consistent with the hypothesis that institutions and insiders are informed, we¯nd a positive relationship between adverse selection costs and the proportion of institutional and insider ownership. However, as with the relation between spreads and ownership, there are there are con°icting results in the literature about the relation between adverse selection and ownership. Jennings, Schnatterly and and Seguin (2000)¯nd a negative relationship between adverse selection and institutional ownership. This could be due to the fact that these conclusions are drawn from univariate results. Similar to our results, Sarin, Shastri and Shastri (2000) nd a positive relationship between insider ownership and adverse selection costs. However, theȳ nd that institutional ownership is negatively related to adverse selection costs. This is puzzling, since it is not consistent with the results in He°in and Shaw (2000) . The result in Sarin, Shastri, and Shastri (2000) may be due to the particular sample of data that they use. Again, we estimate their model using our sample, and¯nd that adverse selection is positively related to institutional ownership.
Overall, previous work on the relationship between ownership and informed trading provides no clear consensus. Our tests include the same measures and techniques as in previous studies.
We argue that the con°icting results in other studies originate from model speci¯cation and the particular sample of data. In addition, we also study the relationship between ownership structure, the price impact of a trade and the probability of informed trading. We discuss these measures in more detail in the next section.
Measures of Information-Based Trading
In order to test the relationship between ownership structure and informed trading, we must¯rst estimate the amount of information-based trading. However, distinguishing informative trades from liquidity trades poses some serious di±culties. Ideally, we would identify trades executed for institutions or insiders and compare the impact of those trades to retail trades executed for individuals. Unfortunately, since no data exist that classify the identity of traders, 1 we must rely on proxies for the intensity of information-based trading. In this section, we outline the¯ve di®erent measures of informed trading that we use in the paper. Each of these measures relies, in 1 With the exception of the TORQ database, which only covers November 1990 to January 1991.
some way, on the sensitivity of price changes to the direction and/or the size of the order°ow or order imbalance. Our¯ve measures of information-based trading are:
1. The quoted bid-ask spread: S This is the most primitive measure of information-based trading. Theoretical models of Kyle (1985) , Glosten and Harris (1988) and Amihud and Mendelson (1986) argue that the spread is a function of the amount of information asymmetry in a market. In these models,¯nancial intermediaries face a standard \lemons-market" problem. Given that informed investors and liquidity traders are not easily distinguishable, intermediaries drive a wedge between the bid and ask price. This spread enables dealers or specialists to earn a pro¯t from liquidity traders that compensates them for providing liquidity to informed traders. The size of the spread, therefore, is a proxy for the proportion of informed traders in the market. The model identi¯es these components by measuring how prices change as a function of the direction of the last trade. We de¯ne an indicator variable, Q t , which takes on the values f¡1; 0; 1g based on the direction of the last trade. That is, de¯ne P t and M t as the transaction price and the midpoint of the spread at time t, respectively. Q t is then de¯ned as:
order). S is the quoted spread and " t represents the random (iid) public information shock at time t. The regression equation is then speci¯ed by:
where ® measures the proportion of the half spread, S, that stems from information costs.
The remaining proportion of the spread (1 ¡ ®) is due to order processing costs and market maker rents. This speci¯cation is slightly di®erent from that of Huang and Stoll (1997) , who assume that inventory costs are also captured by ®. That is, we assume that inventory costs, as a proportion of the spread, are equal to zero. To the extent that inventory costs do exist, they will be captured in our estimate of ®: However, recent empirical evidence suggests that inventory costs are likely to be close to zero (Madhavan and So¯anos (1998) ).
To understand the intuition behind this model, consider the limiting cases. If ® = 0, then previous trades provide no information. As a result, there should be no reason for the midpoint of the spread to change. In this case, orders simply bounce between a¯xed bid and ask as the true value of the security follows a martingale sequence. On the other hand, if ® = 1, then the last trade signals to the dealer that the trade was fully informative. As a result, the market maker moves the midpoint of the spread to the last transaction price. That is, the dealer moves the spread to straddle the last bid (following a sell order) or ask (following a buy order). For value of ® between 0 and 1, the amount by which the midpoint of the spread moves in reaction to the last trade measures the amount of the spread attributable to this component. We call this measure HS.
The adverse selection cost: HS2
This measure is a simple transformation of the adverse selection component the spread from percentage terms into dollar costs. To construct this measure, we simply multiply our estimate of ® by the average spread S. This measure is therefore just the product of our¯rst two 7 measures and is given by:
4. The Hasbrouck-Foster-Viswanathan price impact of a trade: HFV Our fourth measure is based on the models of Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Hasbrouck (1991) . Given that orders are often serially correlated (i.e. buy orders tend to follow buy orders; sells follow sells), some portion of the order°ow may be expected. The VAR model of Hasbrouck (1991) accounts for this by allowing the informativeness of a trade to depend only on the unexpected portion of the order°ow.
Let V t be the signed trade volume corresponding to the time t price change ¢P t , and let Q t be the trade indicator variable described above. Following Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), we estimate the following model using¯ve lags:
The¯rst regression in this framework¯nds the portion of the signed order°ow, V t ; that cannot be explained by past order°ow or price changes. We use the residuals from this regression, ¿; as a proxy for the unexpected portion of the order°ow in the second regression on price changes. In this setup, HF V (the coe±cient on the unexpected order°ow) measures the impact of a trade on future price changes in a similar manner to ®. However, this measure accounts for serial correlation in order°ow.
The probability of informed trading: PI
Our¯nal measure of information costs di®ers from the previous four. Rather than estimate the size of the spread or the sensitivity of prices to order°ow, we estimate the probability of informed trading using the sequential trade model of Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara and Paperman (1996) . The EKOP model relies on the total number of buy and sell trades during a day to identify informed trading. In this model, information events may occur only before the start of trading on each day. 2 The probability of an information event occurring is given by ®: Given that an information event has occurred, the probability of bad news occurs with probability ± while good news has probability (1 ¡ ±): In this model, there are two types of stylized traders: informed traders who know the true value of the asset and uninformed traders who trade purely for liquidity purposes. The key feature of this model is that the arrival of these two types of traders is governed by independent poisson processes. Regardless of information events, the arrival rate of uninformed traders is ": Informed traders, on the other hand, will arrive to the market only if an information event has occurred, and then only on one side of the market with arrival rate ¹: The probability of informed trading is then given by:
Since the distribution of the number of buy and sell trades is governed by poisson processes, the parameters of the model may be estimated via maximum likelihood. The likelihood of observing B buys and S sells over some time interval T on a given day can therefore be summarized as the sum of three weighted poisson processes in which the weights are given by the probability of an information event, ®; and the probability of the bad news, ±:
Assuming that the days are independent, the likelihood of observing a sequence of buys and
over N days is simply:
We use constrained maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters of the likelihood function.
The probabilities ® and ± are constrained to lie in the interval (0; 1) and the arrival rates "
and ¹ are constrained to be between zero and 1. The probability of informed trading, PI;
is then constructed using our estimates of ®; "; and ¹: Standard errors for PI are computed by the delta method.
Data
Our sample consists of all domestic common stock securities listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. From this universe of stocks, we select only those¯rms for which data can be found on both the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes and the Trade and Quote (TAQ)
database. Further, we require that there be at least 500 trades in each security per quarter to ensure accurate estimates of our information measures. In addition, a security must be actively traded for at least 30 trading days during a quarter to be included in the sample. From thesē lters, we retain roughly 5,500¯rms per quarter from Q4 1997 to Q4 1998. Table I provides a description of our sample over time, by exchange. Roughly one third of our¯rms are from the NYSE, 7% from AMEX and 60% from the NASDAQ. Since there are signi¯cant di®erences in the market microstructure of these exchanges, we allow our results to vary by exchange. In addition, Section 7 explores the sensitivity of our results to exchange type.
The data for our tests come from three sources. First, we collect descriptive statistics from CRSP. For each¯rm in our sample, we construct quarterly measures of price (P), market capitalization (SIZE), volume (V OL), share turnover (TU RN) and volatility (V OLAT ). Quarterly price is measured as the average daily closing price during the quarter. Quarterly market capi-talization is the average daily market capitalization (price times shares outstanding) during the quarter. Quarterly volume is taken to be the total number of shares transacted over the quarter.
Share turnover is total quarterly volume divided by shares outstanding. The volatility of returns is constructed for each¯rm-quarter as the standard deviation of daily returns over the quarter.
Our second data source is the TAQ database provided by the NYSE. These¯les contain records for all trades and quotes for the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Quarterly measures of the quoted spread are calculated as the di®erence between the ask and bid price over all quotes during standard trading hours for each¯rm-quarter. Relative spreads are calculated as average quoted spreads divided by price midpoints. The transactions from the TAQ database are also used to construct the various information measures using the methodologies described in Section 2.
The third source of data for this study is Disclosure Incorporated's Compact D database. The percentage of shares held by institutions (INST ) and insiders (IN SIDE) was collected from this database, and the data was matched to CRSP and TAQ by the¯rm's CUSIP number.
To isolate the e®ect that ownership structure may have on informed trading, we control for other factors that may a®ect our microstructure measures of the information impact of a trade.
This section describes the rational for including explanatory variables as well as the variable's construction.
Studies such as Hasbrouck (1991) have shown that information asymmetries can be smaller for larger¯rms. We know that institutional ownership is highly correlated with size (Gompers and Metrick 2001). Since our hypothesis is that institutions are better informed than individuals, we would expect to¯nd more evidence of informed trading for¯rms that have higher levels of institutional ownership. Since the impact of informed trading is due to information asymmetry between the market maker and the trader, the size e®ect should bias us against¯nding that largē rms, which have a lower amount of information asymmetry, exhibit a larger impact from informed trading. However, the result that larger¯rms have lower informational asymmetries could be due to larger analyst coverage. While the uncovering of private information (or better processing of public information) reduces the information asymmetry, it can also increase the information impact of trading.
Since size may play a role in the impact of informed trading, we control for it to reduce spurious results. We compute the daily market value of equity for a¯rm using the closing price for that day. Since the market value of equity is not stationary though time, we divide the¯rm's daily market value of equity by the average market value of equity for all¯rms on that day. This gives a measure of how large a¯rm is relative to the average¯rm. We then average this measure over all days in the calendar quarter to arrive at the the¯rm's average relative market value of equity for that quarter.
Table II describes our sample of¯rms. Given the large number of¯rms in our study, there is considerable variation in size, price and volume over our sample. There is also signi¯cant left skewness in each of these variables (means are much larger than medians). As a result, we use log transformations of the variables in all our tests to mitigate the in°uence of outliers.
Our¯ve measures of the information content of trading are consistent with previous studies.
The average quoted spread in our sample is 26. Given that we use¯ve di®erent proxies for the information content of trades, we also examine the relationship between our various measures. Table III provides a correlation table for HS2, HFV and PI) are positively and signi¯cantly related to each other with the exception of the PI and H S, which have a negative correlation. In general, the PI has a low correlation with our other measures of information-based trading. This¯nding is, perhaps, not surprising considering that the P I is estimated using only daily order imbalances while the other three estimated measures (HS, HS2 and H FV ) are constructed using intraday price sensitivities. Overall, our¯ve measures are related to each other in a roughly consistent manner, yet appear uncorrelated enough to provide independent proxies for information-based trading. Table IV The PI measure, however, tells a di®erent story. Stocks that have high levels of institutional ownership have a lower probability that any given trade is informed. While the conclusions from di®erent measures seem to be con°icting, these results are only univariate. It could be the case that the P I measure is low for stocks with high levels of institutional ownership simply because these stocks are larger and have much higher volume than the lower quintiles.
Univariate Results
The univariate patterns for insider ownership are di®erent than those for institutional ownership.
The relative spread, the adverse selection cost (HS2) and the PI measures are all increasing with increased insider ownership, while the adverse selection component (H S) is decreasing with increased insider ownership. Again, the same concerns that apply to the univariate institutional ownership analysis apply here as well. For example, insider ownership is negatively related to both 14 the size and turnover of the¯rm. It could be the case that the P I measure is high for stocks with high levels of insider ownership simply because these stocks have much lower volume than the other quintiles. To address these problems, in Section 6 we examine these questions in a multivariate setting.
Multivariate Results
In the previous section, our univariate tests produced mixed results regarding the relationship between ownership structure and information-based trading. However, there may be systematic di®erences in¯rm size and liquidity that vary with both ownership and information-based trad- 
INF O is one of the¯ve measures of information-based trading that were described in Section 3. Since institutions have a preference for large, liquid¯rms we include size, volume, and turnover as control variables. We include volume in equation (1) 
Relation (2) captures the e®ect that ownership structure has on the measure of informed trading.
The control variables in equation (2) The correlations between the independent variables are in Table V . As we would expect, the correlation between institutional ownership, size, volume price and turnover is large and positive.
Also, stocks with high institutional ownership tend to have lower volatilities. 3 The correlations between insider ownership and institutional ownership size are negative, indicating that those¯rms that have a high percentage of insider ownership tend to be smaller and not heavily owned by institutions. Furthermore, the size of the¯rm, volume and turnover are all highly positively correlated.
We estimate the coe±cients in the simultaneous equation model comprised of equations (2) and (3) by two-stage least squares. and¯nd that the coe±cient on institutional and insider ownership is negative.
We interpret this result as the strong institutional preference for liquid stocks. The results are economically, as well as statistically, signi¯cant. Solving (2) and (3) While there is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and the relative spread, the opposite is true for our measure of adverse selection and price impact. As mentioned before, the bene¯t of using the price impact of a trade is that it accounts for serial correlation in order°ow.
We believe that it is not large trades, but rather unexpectedly large trades that carry information.
To capture this we do not use trade size as a control variable in the regression, but rather use the HFV measure of price impact to account for the impact of the unexpected portion of order°ow.
Controlling for¯rm size, volatility, share turnover, volume, and exchange type, there is a statis- It is puzzling that institutional ownership is negatively related to the probability of informed trading. While this is consistent with the univariate results, it is the opposite of what we expected.
In results discussed later in the paper, this appears to be the case only for NASDAQ stocks -there is no signi¯cant relationship between institutional ownership and the probability of informed trading for stocks listed on the NYSE/AMEX.
The e®ects of insider ownership on informed trading are similar to the e®ects of institutional ownership, but insider ownership has a smaller economic impact. We¯nd that all three measures of information-based trading -the adverse selection component of the spread, price impact and probability of informed trading -are positively related to insider ownership and are statistically signi¯cant, as we would expect. While our results suggest that both types of ownership are 18 positively related to the adverse selection component of and price impact on the bid-ask spread, institutional ownership has an economic impact that is an order of magnitude larger than that of insider ownership. For example, a change in insider ownership from the 2nd to the 4th quintile would result in a the spread being reduced to only nine-tenths of its original value. Furthermore, such a change in insider ownership would correspond to a 1.3 percent increase in the adverse selection component of the spread, or about one-half of one cent. We attribute this to the fact that institutions generate a much higher volume of trade than insiders, and risk-averse market makers want to protect themselves from incurring larger dollar losses trading against informed institutions.
Generally, the control variables have the expected signs and signi¯cance. The coe±cient on volume is negative and signi¯cant, indicating that more liquid stocks have lower costs of informed trading. The coe±cient on turnover is positive and signi¯cant in the relative spread regression, which is puzzling. However, since turnover is highly correlated with volume, it is di±cult to interpret this result. Also, the sign and signi¯cance of the estimated coe±cients on the ownership variables, which are the central variables of interest, do not change when turnover is dropped from the model. The coe±cients on volatility are all positive and signi¯cant, indicating that more volatilē rms have higher information costs associated with them. Though we estimated the models using the logarithm of volume, turnover and volatility, the signs and signi¯cance of the coe±cients are the same when the original variables are used.
The second panel in Table VI contains the estimated coe±cients from equation (3) in the model.
Here, institutional ownership is a function of the measure of informed trading,¯rm size, volume, turnover, and the reciprocal of price. The estimated coe±cient on the relative spread is negative, which is consistent with existing evidence that institutions prefer stocks that have lower spreads.
While the estimated coe±cient on percentage of the spread that represents the adverse selection cost (HS) is positive, the coe±cient on the dollar cost of the adverse selection (HS2) is negative.
This implies that institutions avoid these stocks. One possible explanation is that they do so in an attempt to lower their e®ective cost of trading. On the other hand, the estimated coe±cient on price impact (H FV ) and probability of informed trading (PI) are all positive and signi¯cant, which implies that institutions favor these stocks. While this is counter-intuitive, there are many factors that go into a money manager's decision to purchase a stock besides our measures of informed trading. Omission of these factors could bias this result. The purpose of this study is not to model these factors but rather to understand the impact of ownership structure on informed trading.
Size and turnover are positive and signi¯cant, indicating that institutions prefer large¯rms with high turnover. Volume is negative and signi¯cant in all the models, which is the opposite of what one would expect. Again, this result appears to be driven by the correlation with turnover.
When the model is re-estimated without turnover, volume is positive and signi¯cant, as one would expect. Since we are primarily concerned with the estimated coe±cients on the ownership variables in equation (2), the inclusion of highly correlated control variables will not bias our estimates of these coe±cients.
The statistical and economic signi¯cance of both institutional and insider ownership are robust to a variety of model speci¯cations. First, when either volume or turnover are dropped from (2) the results are unchanged. Also, the results are robust to dropping either volume or turnover from (3). Last, we estimated the model in (2) and (3) without the log-transformation of size, volume, turnover, and volatility and the results do not change qualitatively.
Di®erences by exchange type
In the previous sections, we show that the information content of trades increases with the proportion of institutional and insider ownership. However, the nature of information-based trading may vary systematically by the type of exchange an issue is traded on. For example, recent evidence suggests that dealer markets such as the NASDAQ may be more anonymous than auction 20 markets. 4 In this section, we test whether the relationship between information and ownership structure di®ers by exchange type.
In Table VI the coe±cient on the NASDAQ dummy variable is signi¯cant and more positive than the NYSE dummy in the spread and HS2 regressions. This result is consistent with earlier work comparing transactions costs on dealer and auction markets (see e.g., Huang and Stoll (1996) ). However, NASDAQ stocks have, on average, a smaller adverse selection component of the spread and probability of informed trading when compared to the NYSE stocks. These results are also consistent with previous studies comparing the components of the spread between dealer and auction markets (see A²eck-Graves, Hedge, and Miller (1994)). The AMEX, also an auction market, has mixed results compared to the NYSE with a smaller spread and probability of informed trading but a larger HS, HS2 and H FV .
Table VII provides a summary of our estimation of the simultaneous equation model of equation (2) by exchange type. Here we include a constant but do not include exchange dummies. We perform the regression separately for¯rms listed on an auction market (like the NYSE or AMEX)
and¯rms listed on a dealer market (NASDAQ). Table VII presents the coe±cients on the ownership variables only. 5 Overall, we¯nd that the relationship between ownership and informed trading is consistent across di®erent exchange types. The only di®erence between the exchanges appears to be in the probability of informed trading. Insider ownership is positively related to the probability of informed trading on the NYSE-AMEX, but not on the NASDAQ. In contrast, institutional ownership is not related to the probability of informed trading on the NYSE-AMEX, but on the NASDAQ there is a negative relationship. The coe±cients on ownership for the HS, PI, and HF V regressions are smaller for the NASDAQ sample, while the impact of ownership on our HS2
measures are larger for NASDAQ stocks. We interpret these results as evidence that individual investors are less informed than institutions or insiders, regardless of the trading environment. 
Correlations between information measures
This table contains the correlation coe±cients between the proxies for the information content of trades that are used in the regressions. The quoted spread is taken as the di®erence between the posted ask and bid price over all transactions for each stock-quarter as reported on the TAQ database. The relative spread is the quoted spread divided by price. The adverse selection component of the spread is estimated using the methodology of Huang and Stoll (1997 
Correlations between independent variables
This table contains the correlation coe±cients between the independent variables that are used in the pooled and¯xed e®ects regressions. INST is the percentage of shares held by institutional owners, INSIDE is the percentage of shares held by company insiders, SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, T URN is the average daily turnover for the¯rm during the quarter, V OLAT is the logarithm of the standard deviation of the¯rm's returns over the preceding 90 days, and V OL is the natural logarithm of the daily volume in shares. where t indexes the end of calendar quarter for the period from December 31, 1997 to December 31, 1998 , and i indexes the¯rm. The dependent variable (IN F O) is one of the¯ve measures of the information component of the spread. LN SP READ is the log of the di®erence between the posted ask and bid price, divided by the price midpoint, over all transactions for each stock-quarter as reported on the TAQ database. HS is the adverse selection component of the spread estimated using the methodology of Huang and Stoll (1997) . HS2, the adverse selection cost, is the adverse selection component of the spread multiplied by the average quoted spread. HF V is the Hasbrouck-Foster-Viswanathan measure constructed following Hasbrouck (1991) (with¯ve lags). P I is the probability of informed trading estimated via maximum likelihood following Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara, and Paperman (1996) . IN ST is the percentage of shares held by institutional owners, IN SIDE is the percentage of shares held by company insiders, V OL is the natural logarithm of the daily volume in shares, T U RN is the average daily turnover for the¯rm during the quarter, V OLAT is the logarithm of the standard deviation of the¯rm's returns over the preceding 90 days, SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, P is the¯rm's share price, and N ASDAQ, AMEX, and N Y SE are equal to one if the¯rm trades on the respective exchange and zero otherwise. The t-statistics are shown in the parentheses below coe±cient estimates. Results by exchange type
LNSPREAD

